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 Moral Law 
 Paul  Formosa 
 What is the moral law and what role does it and 
should it play in political theory and political 
practice? In this entry we will try to answer these 
important questions by first examining what the 
moral law is, before investigating the different 
ways in which the relationship between morality 
and politics can be conceptualized. 
 The Moral Law 
 The moral law is generally understood to be a 
law that applies  universally and  categorically . 
The moral law applies universally because it 
applies to  all actions or, at least, sets moral 
boundaries which  no action may ever right-
fully exceed. As such, we cannot undertake an 
action that falls outside of the scope of the 
moral law. The moral law applies categorically 
because it applies  unconditionally . The moral 
law says: do this or don’t do that  without 
condition . The moral law does not say: abide by 
the moral law only  if it is in your self-interest or 
only  if your particular culture demands it. If, 
for example, it is in my self-interest to lie but 
the moral law forbids it, then the advantage 
that I will derive from lying does not under-
mine or limit the force of the moral duty not to 
lie. We are bound by the moral law in all that 
we do and the moral law trumps all other con-
siderations and reasons. 
 But what is the  content of the moral law? 
According to a common distinction, the moral 
law is either a consequentialist or a deontolog-
ical  law. According to the consequentialist, it 
is   consequences alone that matter morally. 
 Act-utilitarianism is the most prominent 
 version of consequentialism (Bentham  1970 ; 
Mill  1972 ). According to an act-utilitarian the 
moral law says: always act in such a way that 
you maximize overall utility, where utility is 
usually understood in terms of pleasure or 
happiness. According to this view, I ought to do 
that act which would lead to the most happi-
ness. For example, if in a particular situation I 
only have a choice between lying and telling 
the truth, and lying will lead to greater overall 
utility (that is, greater overall happiness) than 
telling the truth, then the moral law demands 
categorically that I tell a lie on this occasion. 
But if on another occasion telling the truth will 
lead to greater overall utility than telling a lie, 
then the moral law categorically demands that 
I tell the truth on that occasion. 
 According to the deontologist, it is not 
 consequences alone that matter morally. Other 
things matter morally, such as a person’s inten-
tions or maxims, or the moral fact that certain 
actions are contrary to duty independently 
of  the consequences. According to a simple 
 version of deontology the moral law says that 
certain listed act-types, such as lying, cheating, 
torturing, stealing, murdering and so on, are 
morally forbidden. These listed act-types are 
morally wrong, come what may, and under 
any  circumstances. For example, if lying is 
forbidden by the moral law, then I may not lie 
no matter what the consequences. On a more 
complicated version of deontology, such as 
Immanuel Kant’s ( 1996a ) categorical impera-
tive, the moral law says that we must only act 
on maxims that we could will to be universal 
laws for all rational agents or, on another 
 version, that we must always act in such a way 
that we treat all persons as ends in themselves 
and never as mere means. Kant’s categorical 
imperative is more complicated than the simple 
version of deontology listed above because it 
does not, at least directly, simply list various 
act-types, such as lying under any circum-
stances, as morally forbidden. For example, 
while Kant’s categorical imperative does forbid 
lying simply in order to enrich oneself, it is at 
least a matter of debate whether the categorical 
imperative sometimes permits (or even requires) 
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lying under other circumstances, such as 
lying  in order to defend one’s life or property 
(Formosa  2008a ). But on both  versions of 
deontology I must always abide by the moral 
law whatever the consequences. 
 A third version of the content of the moral 
law, which goes under the rubric of virtue 
theory, says that the focus on  actions as the pri-
mary subject of an  abstract moral law is a mis-
take. Instead, virtue theorists understand the 
primary subject of the moral law to be a per-
son’s character and his or her character traits. 
Virtue theory directs us to develop certain 
character traits called virtues, such as honesty 
and courage, and to avoid other character traits 
called vices, such as meanness and cruelty 
(Aristotle 1984; Hursthouse  1999 ). According 
to some versions of virtue theory the moral law 
says that on any particular occasion you ought 
to do what a moral sage, who has fully devel-
oped all the virtues and has none of the vices, 
would do in those circumstances. For example, 
if a moral sage would respond with a certain 
degree of justified anger in a particular context, 
then I ought to respond with the same degree 
of  justified anger in that same context. Of 
course, this is only a very quick and simplistic 
overview of these important and complex 
accounts of the content of the moral law, but 
this shall suffice for our purposes here. 
 The Role of the Moral Law in Politics 
 When we ask, what is the relationship between 
the moral law (and thus morality) and politics, 
we need to keep two distinct questions in mind. 
First, what is the relationship between the 
moral law and  political theory ? Second, what is 
the relationship between the moral law and 
 politics or  political practice ? We shall look at 
each of these questions in turn. 
 In the first case we are asking a question 
about how the moral law relates to our theo-
rizing about politics, rather than our practice 
of politics. But what is political theory about? 
One common answer is that political theory is 
about developing a theory of justice. Justice, 
following John Rawls ( 1999 ), is a theory about 
what form the basic structure of a society 
should have so that it can be justified to any 
reasonable person living within that structure. 
For Rawls the basic structure of a society 
includes all those institutions that have a 
 profound, deep, and lasting impact on how 
well a person fares in that society. Rawls 
includes as part of the basic structure of a 
society the government, the rights that persons 
enjoy, as well as markets, systems of property 
ownership, and the family. On this view 
political theory is a  normative theory about 
what form the basic institutions of a society 
ought to have. Once we have developed a 
theory of justice we can use that theory to 
judge how well our existing institutions live up 
to that ideal. We can contrast morality and 
political theory so understood in this way: 
whereas morality is about what an individual 
ought to do on a particular occasion, or what 
sort of character traits an individual should 
develop, justice is about what form the basic 
institutions of a society ought to have. Of 
course, it is a separate question, and one that 
we shall return to below, whether the moral law 
should play any role in our political theory 
about what counts as a just basic structure. 
 Another common answer is that political 
theory should not be about developing a theory 
of justice, but about describing how the basic 
institutions of real societies actually operate. 
On this view political theory (or political sci-
ence) is understood to be a  descriptive theory 
about how in fact the basic institutions of a 
society operate. Once we have developed that 
theory we may use it to predict outcomes, as a 
strategic tool, or as a basis for reform. Power 
will be a key focus of any such theory. The key 
political questions will be about how power is 
acquired and maintained, strengthened or 
weakened, and exercised effectively or ineffec-
tively. The aim of such a theory is not to ima-
gine some ideal political form, but to understand 
what form political institutions actually take. 
We can contrast morality and political theory 
so understood in this way: politics is about the 
effective attainment and exercise of power and, 
as such, questions of morality are not relevant 
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to our theorizing about politics except insofar 
as morality can be used as a means of attaining 
or exercising power. 
 In the second case we are asking a question 
about how the moral law relates to our practice 
of politics, rather than our theorizing about 
politics. Here the question is not about what 
form the basic institutions of a society ought to 
(or do) have, but rather about how political 
actors ought to (or do) act within that institu-
tional setting. While political actors might be 
understood broadly to include all citizens in a 
democracy, for our purposes we will restrict our 
scope to  powerful political actors, such as political 
leaders, high officials, and leaders of powerful 
organizations (including the media). The reason 
for this limited scope is that it is usually only 
these political actors who have the power to 
directly make important decisions and influence 
important outcomes. Having this power means 
that they will face difficult questions about the 
relationship between morality and politics that 
the average citizen does not normally face. 
 How should powerful political actors view 
the moral law? Again, there are at least two 
prominent views. First, that political actors 
ought to always act morally. The reason for this 
is that the moral law applies categorically and 
universally. Politicians are therefore bound by 
the same moral law that the rest of us are bound 
by, and they ought to live up to it just as we 
ought to live up to it. This view belongs to the 
 idealist tradition. Second, that political actors 
ought to at least sometimes act immorally. The 
reason for this is that political actors have 
 special responsibilities and duties as powerful 
political actors. If political actors were to always 
act morally then this would have disastrous 
consequences for the political community 
they  represent or lead. These special political 
responsibilities mean that political actors are 
either not always bound by the moral law 
(thereby denying the universality of the moral 
law) or are in situations in which the moral 
law  is overridden by political considerations 
(thereby denying the categoricalness of the 
moral law). This view belongs to the  realist 
 tradition (Morgenthau & Thompson  1985 ). 
 The relationship between morality and politics 
is clearest in cases of the  conflict  between them. 
But whether there really  is a conflict between 
morality and politics in any particular case will 
depend on how we understand both morality 
and politics. For example, imagine that the only 
way to prevent a ticking time bomb from 
exploding in a crowded city is to torture the 
innocent child of a terrorist who has planted the 
bomb in order to find out the bomb’s location in 
time to defuse it. It is no good torturing the ter-
rorist himself since he won’t reveal the 
information that way. The only way to get the 
information from him is to  torture his innocent 
child in front of him. Many act-utilitarians will 
claim that the moral law demands that the rele-
vant political leader order the torture of the ter-
rorist’s child since this is the way to maximize 
utility by preventing the bomb from exploding 
and killing many civilians. Many deontologists 
will instead claim that the moral law absolutely 
forbids torturing the terrorist’s innocent child. 
Next, assume that we understand politics in 
terms of the effective exercise of power in the 
self-interest of a political community. According 
to this understanding of politics it is politically 
“necessary” to order the torture of the terrorist’s 
child (Coady  2008 ). As such, we only have a 
conflict in this case between morality and politics 
if we accept a deontological rather than an act-
utilitarian rendering of the moral law. Otherwise 
there is no real conflict. But note that if there is a 
real conflict here, it arises because a deontolog-
ical morality forbids us from ordering an action 
that is deemed politically necessary. But the 
conflict can also work the other way around. 
Imagine the same example, but this time we 
understand politics to be the practical realization 
of the principles of justice. Next, assume that 
those principles of justice, at the very least, abso-
lutely forbid the torturing of innocents. As such, 
we only have a conflict in this case  between 
morality and politics if we accept an act- 
utilitarian rather than a deontological rendering 
of the moral law. And if there is a real conflict 
here, it arises because a justice-based under-
standing of politics forbids us from ordering an 
action that is deemed morally necessary. 
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 Keeping in mind that how we think of the 
relationship between morality and politics will 
depend on how we conceive of morality and 
politics, we can think of the conflict between 
morality and politics in the following four 
ways: the no conflict view, the morality trumps 
politics view, the politics trumps morality view, 
and the politics and morality as a negotiation 
view. On the first view there is no  real conflict 
between morality and politics properly under-
stood. Any conflict is only apparent and based 
on a misunderstanding of either politics or 
morality or both. On all the remaining views 
there is a real conflict between morality and 
politics. When they conflict, on the second 
view, morality always trumps politics, whereas 
on the third view, politics always trumps 
morality. On the fourth view, when they 
conflict neither necessarily trumps the other. 
Instead a case by case negotiation between 
them must be found in light of the specific cir-
cumstances. Note that the third and fourth 
views are premised on the rejection of the cat-
egoricalness of the moral law. Both views imply 
that at least under certain circumstances the 
moral law is trumped by political consider-
ations. Finally, the focus on the conflict of 
morality and politics can lead us to ignore the 
way that morality and politics can be  mutually 
supporting under favorable conditions. We shall 
briefly look at each of these five views below. 
 The No Conflict View 
 Kant defends a version of the no conflict view in 
his essay  Toward Perpetual Peace in which he 
argues that “there can be no conflict of politics 
( Politik ), as doctrine of right ( Rechtslehre ) put 
into practice, with morals ( Moral ), as theoretical 
doctrine of right.” The only way that we can 
 conceive of a conflict is if we understood politics 
as “a general  doctrine of prudence ( Klugheitslehre ), 
that is, a theory of maxims for choosing the 
most suitable means to one’s purposes aimed 
at  advantage, that is, to deny that there is a 
[ doctrine of] morals at all” (Kant  1996b : 338). 
We can paraphrase Kant’s argument here as 
follows: if we understand politics as the practical 
implementation of principles of justice then 
there is no conflict between politics and morality 
because morality demands that we practically 
implement principles of justice. A conflict can 
only arise if we understand politics as a doctrine 
of prudence rather than as an implementation of 
justice. But to understand politics as a doctrine 
of prudence is to deny the validity of the moral 
law because it is to deny either the universality 
or the categoricalness of the moral law by 
implying that the moral law does not apply to all 
political cases or does not always trump political 
considerations. 
 However, Kant does not ignore the strategic 
element of politics: “politics says, ‘ Be ye wise as 
serpents .’” But he insists that “morals add” (as 
a  limiting condition) “ and guileless as doves ” 
(Kant  1996b : 338). To illustrate his point 
Kant  contrasts a “moral politician,” who acts 
 prudently within the bounds of morality, with 
a “political moralist,” who crafts a morality to 
suit his political goals. A moral politician 
regards the question of what he ought to do 
as a moral question about what is required by 
principles of right. But a moral politician 
does not ignore strategic concerns, unlike the 
“ despotizing moralists” who ignore political 
prudence by, for example, adopting measures 
“prematurely.” Rather, a moral politician “takes 
the principles of political prudence in such a 
way that they can coexist with morals” (Kant 
 1996b : 340–1). 
 In contrast, a political moralist regards the 
question of what she ought to do as a purely 
strategic question about how she can most pru-
dently achieve her goals, whatever those goals 
are. But while, for strategic reasons, political 
moralists do not publically “disown all alle-
giance to the concept of a public right,” they do 
“frame a morals to suit” their own advantage 
(Kant  1996b : 340–1). For example, if it is in a 
political moralist’s self-interest to lie or to 
invade another country, then she will invent a 
moral “justification” that suits her interests, 
rather than first testing whether the moral law 
authorizes her to act as she intends. A common 
“justification” that political moralists use, Kant 
notes, is to claim that, given how evil humans 
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are, if one does not act first against one’s enemy 
then one’s enemy will be sure to act first and 
then it will be too late to act. Further, political 
moralists tend to be guided in their actions by 
well-known, but mostly immoral, strategic 
maxims. These maxims include: “ fac et excusa ,” 
act whenever conditions are favorable and suc-
cess will be its own justification after the fact; 
“ si fecisti, nega ,” when you act wrongly deny 
that the guilt is yours; and “ divide et impera ,” 
divide your opponents and then conquer them 
(Kant  1996b : 342). 
 Against Kant’s view it could be argued that 
Kant fails to take seriously the conflict between 
politics and morality. For example, a politician 
may believe that he or she needs to lie in order 
to win an election or to maintain his or her 
position of power. While Kant ( 1996b : 339) 
notes that honesty is not always “ the best politics 
[in the prudential sense],” he still maintains 
that “ honesty is better than all politics [in the 
prudential sense].” A politician’s personal 
self-interest is no excuse for immorality. But 
what if it is not a politician’s  personal self-
interest that is at stake, but the survival of a 
political community as an independent state? 
This question assumes that acting wisely in 
accordance with principles of justice can be 
incompatible with defending the existence of a 
political community against external threats. 
But why should this be? 
 Kant denies that acting justly will put the 
survival of a political community at stake. 
Indeed, quite the opposite, Kant argues that 
acting on principles of justice is likely to be 
prudent, especially in the longer term given the 
difficulties of accurately predicting the conse-
quences of political actions, since it will lead to 
a more just domestic and international order. 
A more just domestic order is likely to be more 
stable as it will be seen to have legitimacy by all 
(or most) citizens. A more just international 
order is likely to be more stable as it will lead, 
Kant argues, to a condition of perpetual peace 
between democratic states and an international 
order which will be seen by all states to have 
greater legitimacy. In contrast, immoral 
political machinations in the domestic case will 
imprudently undermine the state’s internal 
legitimacy, and in the international context will 
imprudently maintain an international state of 
nature in which might and not right rules. In 
such an international state of nature the 
national security of each state is always under 
threat. As such, the most prudent way for states 
to maintain their national security is to do 
what international and cosmopolitan justice 
demands of them and that is to work with other 
states to develop and maintain an effective and 
permanent association or congress of states 
which can maintain a condition of perpetual 
peace. But in the meantime, Kant does not 
deny that a state may rightfully defend itself 
against an act of aggression, provided that it 
does not employ certain immoral means, such 
as political assassinations. By these sorts of 
arguments Kant seeks to undermine any insur-
mountable tension between meeting the 
demands of morality and justice and prudently 
maintaining national security. 
 Morality Trumps Politics 
 The possibility of conflict between morality 
and politics presupposes that morality and 
politics are distinct normative domains. There 
are distinct moral reasons and there are  distinct 
political reasons and these two reasons can 
come into conflict. The only way to avoid the 
potential for conflict between morality and 
politics is to claim that morality and politics are 
not distinct normative domains. We can make 
that claim either by moralizing politics or by 
politicizing morality. We saw in the previous 
section that Kant adopts the first strategy by 
conceptualizing politics (properly understood) 
as the practical implementation of morality 
applied to the basic structures of a society and 
to the conduct of political actors. Many utili-
tarians will share Kant’s strategy of moralizing 
politics although, of course, they give a differ-
ent account of the moral law and thus of the 
results of applying it. 
 Alternatively, we can politicize morality by 
following Gilbert Harman in rejecting the 
existence of a moral law that is universal and 
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unconditional. Instead, Harman ( 1978 : 114) 
defends a form of moral relativism by claiming 
that morality “rests on a tacit agreement or 
convention among a group of people.” On 
this  view different groups will have different 
 moralities, none of which are more valid than 
any other, which reflect the different tacit 
agreements and conventions that exist among 
different peoples. People have reason to abide 
by these conventions only if they accept them, 
and they accept them because it is in their 
self-interest to do so or because they have been 
raised to believe in them. These conventions are 
the result of actual bargaining between mem-
bers of that group and, as a result, they reflect 
the different bargaining powers of members of 
that group. Harman claims that he can use his 
account to explain why it is a convention that 
there is, for example, a strong moral prohibition 
to not harm others but only a weak moral 
requirement to help others, on the grounds that 
this convention is one that strongly favors the 
rich and the rich, who are powerful, will use 
their superior bargaining power to get a tacit 
agreement that strongly favors them. Since 
morality reflects our actual power in negoti-
ating tacit agreements it follows that morality is 
“continuous with politics” (Harman  1978 : 115). 
Morality is simply an implicit or informal 
 version of power politics or politics as pru-
dence. However, this is an implausible account 
of morality, since if a powerful group, such as 
men, make it a convention in their society that 
they, for example, are permitted to rape any 
unmarried woman they wish to, it would be 
implausible to claim that it was genuinely  moral 
for men to rape unmarried women in that 
society. And when we claim that this practice is 
morally wrong, we do not mean that it is 
immoral for us but moral for them. Rather, we 
mean that it is immoral for anyone, anywhere, 
and it is a problem with relativistic views of 
morality that they cannot adequately even make 
sense of this claim. Politicizing morality there-
fore amounts to denying that there is such a 
thing as morality as we normally understand it. 
 But if we insist that morality and politics are 
distinct normative domains, and thus refuse to 
politicize morality or moralize politics, then the 
possibility of conflict between morality and 
politics arises. This possibility implies the 
endorsement of a form of value pluralism, the 
view that values are multiple and distinct and, 
as such, can come into conflict with one another. 
However, it is not only moral and political 
values that can come into conflict. Other 
values can also lead to conflicts. For example, 
economic values of efficiency can come into 
conflict with morality when unethical business 
practices will increase efficiency, and scientific 
values of increasing knowledge can come into 
conflict with morality when experiments 
involving the unethical treatment of animals 
will increase scientific knowledge. But in both 
of these cases it is usual to claim that when 
morality conflicts with economic efficiency 
or  increasing scientific knowledge, morality 
trumps these other values. Why shouldn’t 
morality similarly trump political values? 
 According to the morality trumps politics 
view, when morality and politics conflict, 
morality should always trump politics. If we 
understand politics as a technical doctrine of 
prudence, rather than as the practical imple-
mentation of principles of right, then Kant’s 
view can also be described as a morality trumps 
politics view. When politics as prudence and 
morality conflict, morality trumps. “The right 
of human beings must be held sacred, however 
great a sacrifice this may cost the ruling power” 
(Kant  1996b : 347). For Kant this follows directly 
from taking seriously the view that the moral 
law applies unconditionally and universally. 
This means that all other normative consider-
ations, including prudential political ones, are 
trumped by moral considerations. 
 A version of this view is famously defended 
by Erasmus in his  Education of a Christian 
Prince , first published in 1516, just three years 
after Machiavelli completed  The Prince . Erasmus 
(1997: 32), working within the context of a 
Christian morality, argues that Christian moral 
principles apply to  all Christians, including 
Christian princes. This leads Erasmus (1997: 51) 
to argue that if “you can be a prince and a good 
man at the same time, you will be performing a 
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magnificent service; but if not, give up the 
 position of prince rather than become a bad 
man for the sake of it.” Erasmus (1997: 51) notes 
that the “roles of good man and prince seem to 
be very much in conflict with each other,” but he 
is clear that when they conflict, morality trumps 
politics. A prince should abdicate and leave 
politics if he can’t be both a good man and a 
prince since the duty to be a good man trumps 
all other considerations. 
 Politics Trumps Morality 
 The politics trumps morality view claims that 
when morality and politics conflict, politics 
always trumps morality. Machiavelli, in  The 
Prince , defends one version of this view. 
Machiavelli tells us that his goal is to say 
something that will be useful to a prince who 
wants to maintain his rule given the way that 
people actually are. And, unfortunately, most 
people are morally vicious. This is a problem 
since the “man who wants to act virtuously in 
every way necessarily comes to grief among so 
many who are not virtuous. Therefore if a 
prince wants to maintain his rule he must learn 
how not to be virtuous” (Machiavelli  1995 : 48). 
Machiavelli ( 1995 : 49) argues that some virtues 
will hinder the prince’s goal of maintaining his 
rule, whereas some vices will bring him “secu-
rity and prosperity.” For this reason the prince 
must not “flinch” from acting viciously when 
this is “necessary for safeguarding the state” 
(Machiavelli  1995 : 48). As such, the prudent 
prince should not, for example, honor his word 
when this is to his disadvantage, even if this is 
morally vicious. Machiavelli, at least on some 
readings, is not denying the validity of the 
moral law, but rather emphasizing the  extra 
political responsibilities the prince has which 
trump his moral responsibilities. The prince 
should put care for his state above care for his 
own soul. However, this conflict only arises 
because other men are not good. Machiavelli 
( 1995 : 55) claims that “if all men were good, 
this precept [of not, for example, honoring 
one’s word] would not be good: but because 
men are wretched creatures who would not 
keep their word to you, you need not keep your 
word to them.” As such, the prince or ruler 
“should not deviate from what is good, if that is 
possible, but he should know how to do evil, if 
that is necessary” (Machiavelli  1995 : 56). And 
evil is necessary at least whenever the security 
and glory of the state is at stake. 
 Against Machiavelli’s view we could insist on 
a clearer differentiation between the personal 
self-interest of the ruler and the security of the 
state. An immoral action might be beneficial to 
the ruler or prince, but hardly necessary for 
maintaining the state. May the prudent prince 
ignore his moral duty in such a case? But if the 
personal self-interest of a mere citizen does not 
trump morality, why should the personal 
self-interest of a ruler or prince trump morality? 
Instead, if we claim that certain supposedly 
immoral actions are politically required only 
when the very survival of the state (not the 
ruler or prince) is at risk, then we only have a 
conflict of politics with morality on the 
assumption that morality absolutely forbids 
self-defense against an aggressor. While some 
versions of a deontological morality forbid all 
violence, such as a Christian ethic that forbids 
self-defense (a “turn the other cheek” code), 
there are also many other understandings of 
the moral law that permit the use of force 
(within certain limits) as a means of self- 
defense. Only in the former case is there a real 
conflict between morality and politics. 
 Carl Schmitt, in  The Concept of the Political , 
endorses the pluralist thesis that there are 
 distinct normative domains, such as the moral, 
the aesthetic, the political, and the economic, 
each of which has its own values and norms. 
Morality is the realm of “good and evil,” 
 aesthetics the realm of the “beautiful and the 
ugly,” and politics is the realm of the “friend and 
[the] enemy” (Schmitt  1996 : 26). Schmitt denies 
the universality of the moral law since he claims 
that there is an independent sphere of political 
action which must be judged by political and 
not moral standards. Schmitt advocates seeing 
political questions in strategic (friend–enemy) 
rather than moral (good–evil) terms. As such, 
Schmitt endorses the politics trumps morality 
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view, since he thinks that, when judging political 
actions, politics always trumps morality. The 
political enemy is not necessarily evil or ugly, 
but they are “existentially something different 
and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts 
with him are possible” (Schmitt  1996 : 27). While 
war is not the aim or purpose of politics, war 
(whether civil war or war between states) is an 
ever present possibility of the political realm. 
Schmitt cautions against “moralized” concep-
tions of the political enemy as evil and inhuman 
since this can lead to a “war of humanity” which 
will involve “the most extreme inhumanity” 
(Schmitt  1996 : 54). 
 Schmitt is surely right that we should not 
 demonize our political opponents as inhuman 
monsters (Formosa  2008b ). But that does not 
mean that we should not think about the moral 
implications of strategic political action. 
Indeed, Schmitt seems confused on just this 
point. For he does not say that we may do 
 anything that is in our strategic political inter-
ests, such as exterminate our enemy without 
provocation. He claims that “if there really are 
enemies in the existential sense … then it is 
justified, but only politically, to repel and fight 
them physically” (Schmitt  1996 : 49). In other 
words, Schmitt seems to be claiming that only 
a war of self-defense is  politically permissible. 
But, as became clear in our discussion of 
Machiavelli, there is only a tension here 
 between politics and morality if we think of 
morality as forbidding self-defense. 
 A very different conflict between morality 
and politics emerges in Rawls’s work on political 
liberalism. Rawls contrasts a  political conception 
of justice with a  comprehensive moral concep-
tion of justice. While Rawls ( 1993 : 11) concedes 
that his preferred political conception of justice 
is, in a sense, “a moral conception” of justice, it 
counts as a  political conception because it is a 
“freestanding view” that is neither a  general nor 
a  comprehensive moral doctrine. A moral doc-
trine is general and comprehensive when it at 
least “applies to a wide range of subjects” and 
“includes conceptions of what is of value in 
human life, and ideals of personal character … 
and much else that is to inform our conduct” 
(Rawls  1993 : 13). A conception is freestanding 
when it can be “expounded apart from, or 
without reference to,” any comprehensive doc-
trine, even though it “fits into and can be sup-
ported by various reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines” (Rawls  1993 : 12). Both utilitarianism 
and Kant’s moral theory, for example, are gen-
eral and comprehensive in this sense. In con-
trast, a freestanding political conception of 
justice applies  only to  the basic structure of a 
society, and does not address ideals of personal 
character and conceptions of what is of value 
in  human life. While Rawls presents his 
political  conception of justice as freestanding, 
he does assert that it can be (and needs to be) 
supported by an “overlapping consensus” among 
“reasonable” comprehensive doctrines. 
 Rawls ( 1993 : 139) understands the most 
important political values to include “the 
values of equal political and civil liberty; fair 
equality of opportunity; … and the social 
bases of mutual respect between citizens.” He 
claims that reasonable citizens can endorse 
these political values from within their own 
comprehensive moral doctrines. As such, citi-
zens who accept different reasonable compre-
hensive moral doctrines will, Rawls thinks, 
endorse the same political values, but do so for 
different moral reasons. However, it is possible 
that these political values and the moral values 
of one’s comprehensive doctrine could come 
into conflict. In that case Rawls ( 1993 : 138) is 
clear that “constitutional essentials and mat-
ters of basic justice are so far as possible to be 
settled by appeal to political values alone.” 
This implies that “political values” normally 
“have sufficient weight to override all other 
values [including moral values] that may come 
into conflict with them [in regard to matters of 
basic justice]” (Rawls  1993 : 138). For example, 
if my comprehensive moral doctrine claims 
that some  citizens, such as homosexuals, do 
not deserve to enjoy the social bases of self-re-
spect, then on Rawls’s view political values 
trump moral values insofar as this touches on 
matters of basic justice. On Rawls’s view a citi-
zen’s comprehensive morality is a “private” 
affair which they have no right (in a plural 
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liberal society) to coercively impose on other 
citizens in regard to matters of basic justice 
 unless the reasons for doing so can be formu-
lated in terms of political values that “all citi-
zens can reasonably be expected to endorse in 
light of their common human reason” (Rawls 
 1993 : 140). Rawls’s view can be understood as a 
version of the politics trumps morality view – at 
least “normally” (Rawls  1993 : 138) – since, for 
Rawls, political values trump moral values 
when they conflict, at least when it comes to 
matters of basic justice. 
 However, against Rawls’s view it can be argued 
that Rawls is wrong to think that his  liberal 
political values  will achieve an overlapping 
 consensus among reasonable comprehensive 
moral doctrines. It can also be argued that the 
supposedly political values that Rawls defends 
are really a comprehensive moral doctrine in 
disguise since they implicitly privilege the liberal 
value of autonomy as an ideal of character. 
Finally, it can be argued that it is too restrictive 
to forbid comprehensive moral and religious 
doctrines from playing a direct political role in 
the justification of basic matters of justice. 
 Another way to conceptualize the conflict 
between morality and politics is to argue that 
the morality of what politicians do in their 
 private lives should not be a political issue. In 
this sense, political issues should trump moral 
issues when judging the competency of politi-
cians. The media’s often excessive focus on the 
sexual scandals and extramarital affairs of pol-
iticians tends to trivialize and displace more 
important political issues. But the sexual 
behavior of politicians often has very little or 
no bearing on their ability to competently and 
effectively discharge their political duties and 
so it should not displace political issues in our 
judgment of the competency of politicians to 
fulfill a political office. We do not believe, for 
example, that a pilot, surgeon, or lawyer who 
has an extramarital affair is therefore unfit to 
hold a position as a pilot, surgeon, or lawyer 
respectively. Why should we judge politicians 
differently? One possible answer is that, in 
some cases, the sexual behavior of politicians 
could be a sign of corruption or a susceptibility 
to corruption. Political corruption will be 
understood here to involve the misuse of the 
powers of political office in order to unfairly 
advantage oneself or one’s friends and family. 
When politicians, for example, misuse their 
power to gain sexual favors, accept bribes, or 
unfairly give preferential treatment to their 
friends or family in the discharging of their 
office, then they are acting corruptly. But, as 
we  have seen, according to the most plausible 
 versions of the politics trumps morality view it is 
 only when the vital interests of the state itself are 
at stake that morality can be trumped by political 
considerations. Since corruptly favoring oneself 
or one’s family and friends has nothing to do 
with the vital interests of the state, plausible ver-
sions of the politics trumps morality view do not 
condone corrupt political behavior. 
 Morality and Politics as a Negotiation 
 The morality and politics as a negotiation view 
agrees that morality and politics can conflict, 
but denies that either should always trump the 
other. Instead, this view tells us that we should 
seek to achieve a case by case negotiated out-
come taking into account both moral and 
political values. We shall look at two versions 
of this view, one where there is a need for an 
ongoing negotiation between morality and 
politics and one where the need for negotiation 
only arises in emergency situations. 
 Max Weber ( 1994 : 310) understands politics 
to be about “striving for a share of power.” 
Weber ( 1994 : 352) lists three qualities that a 
good politician should have: “passion, a sense 
of responsibility, [and] judgment.” Passion is 
associated with an  ethics of conviction , a sense 
of responsibility with an  ethics of responsibility , 
and judgment with the political ability to switch 
between these two ethics. An ethics of convic-
tion focuses on the obligation to always act 
from, and with, moral conviction. A politician 
who lacks convictions becomes attached to the 
pursuit of power for its sake rather than in 
the  “service of the ‘cause’” (Weber  1994 : 354). 
An ethics of responsibility focuses on the 
 importance of taking responsibility for the 
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 consequences of one’s actions. A politician who 
lacks this quality always blames others, or 
fortune, for the bad consequences of her actions. 
 Weber understands an ethics of conviction 
to be a simple deontology that forbids certain 
act-types no matter what the consequences. He 
gives as an example of an ethics of conviction a 
Christian “unworldly ethic of love” which says 
“resist not evil with force.” Weber argues, 
 plausibly enough, that it would be irresponsible 
of a politician to always act on the basis of 
this conviction. Instead a politician should be 
“ governed by the contrary maxim, namely ‘you 
 shall resist evil with force, for if you do not, you 
are  responsible for the spread of evil’” (Weber 
 1994 : 358). As such, a good politician who 
has  such Christian convictions must give up 
“ seeking to save his own soul” if he is to act 
responsibly (Weber  1994 : 366). But Weber 
does not claim that the good politician should 
focus  only on consequences and ignore  all of 
their moral convictions. At times, the politi-
cian must stand on their convictions and say: 
“here I stand, I can do no other” (Weber  1994 : 
367). A politician who only focuses on conse-
quences is lacking in all conviction and a 
 politician who only focuses on his convictions 
is irresponsible. However, when “one  ought to 
act on the basis of an ethics of conviction or 
one of responsibility … are not things about 
which one can give instruction to anybody.” 
Only someone with the good judgment needed 
to negotiate between these two ethics is 
“ capable of having a ‘vocation for politics’” 
(Weber  1994 : 367). The good politician negoti-
ates a compromise between a competing 
political focus on good outcomes and a moral 
focus on acting from convictions. 
 One problem with Weber’s view is that it is 
based on a very simplistic understanding of 
morality as an ethics of conviction. Clearly a 
politician who always obeyed a conviction that 
even self-defense in the face of external threats 
is morally wrong would be an irresponsible 
politician. But, as we noted above, most under-
standings of morality are not so unworldly 
as to forbid self-defense. As such, if our moral 
convictions are more worldly than the unworldly 
Christian ethic of love that Weber bases his 
account on, then there is no reason to assume 
that it will necessarily be irresponsible (in the 
long run) to always abide by those convictions. 
 Michael Walzer ( 1973 : 168) argues that the 
“moral politician” must be willing to get his 
“hands dirty.” Walzer puts this tension in terms 
of a simple deontological moral theory of 
absolute act-type prohibitions and a conse-
quentialist moral theory which focuses on the 
overall good produced. Walzer ( 2004 : 36) 
argues that we must “negotiate the middle 
ground” between these two often incompat-
ible moral demands, especially in times of 
emergency. The moral politician is, for 
example, willing to order the torture of a ter-
rorist, or as in the earlier example the torture 
of the terrorist’s child if necessary, in order to 
locate a ticking time bomb, even though this is 
morally wrong (according to a deontological 
moral theory). The moral politician knows 
that, though politically necessary, ordering 
torture is a “moral crime” and he accepts his 
guilt as a “moral burden.” This is the “tragedy” 
of the moral politician: he must get his hands 
dirty in order to fulfill his political responsibil-
ities. If he “were a moral man and nothing 
else” he would not get his hands dirty. If he 
“were a politician and nothing else” then he 
would get his hands dirty but “pretend that 
they were clean” (Walzer  1973 : 168). Only the 
moral politician negotiates the right compro-
mise between a focus on consequences and a 
focus on abiding by absolute moral prohibi-
tions by getting his hands morally dirty  only 
when it is politically necessary, while acknowl-
edging that his hands  are morally dirty. 
 Walzer’s intuition that it is both morally 
wrong to order torture to locate a bomb and yet 
that it might be politically necessary if this is 
the only way to prevent many deaths cannot be 
dismissed lightly. As much as we would not like 
to have to make such a difficult choice our-
selves, many of us would be glad to have politi-
cians who are willing to make that tough choice 
in order to ensure our safety, even if they must 
carry a moral burden as a result. However, 
against this view it can be argued that, in fact, 
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we never or almost never actually face ticking 
time bomb scenarios and therefore such cases 
provide no real-world justification for torture. 
But even if we do face such scenarios, it may in 
fact be morally permitted to order torture in 
those circumstances, in which case there is no 
conflict between morality and politics. And 
even if it is morally forbidden but politically 
necessary in such  one-off circumstances to 
order torture, it does not follow that we should 
 legalize or  institutionalize practices of torture 
(Miller  2011 ). 
 Morality and Politics are Mutually 
Supporting 
 In the above discussion we focused on cases 
where morality and politics seem to come into 
conflict, especially in extreme emergency situa-
tions. But instead of focusing on such extreme 
cases, we can instead focus on the ways that a 
healthy moral community can help to consti-
tute a well-functioning democratic political 
community under normal conditions. A flour-
ishing democratic polity requires high quality 
reasoned public debate, open to all, about mat-
ters of justice and public policy. But high quality 
reasoned public debate depends, not only on 
the presence of certain institutions, but also 
upon the presence of political virtues or 
character traits in the citizens of that polity. 
These include the virtues of public reasonable-
ness, tolerance, open-mindedness, civility, 
respectfulness, benevolence, and public spirit-
edness (Kymlicka  2002 : 284–326), as well as 
truthfulness and epistemic rationality. But 
many comprehensive moral theories, such as 
Kant’s moral theory, also endorse many of these 
same character traits as moral and epistemic 
virtues. A morally and epistemically virtuous 
citizenry will likely lead to a better democracy 
by leading to better and more extensive public 
debate that is both reasoned and fair-minded, 
greater involvement by citizens in political 
processes, and greater scrutiny by citizens of the 
actions of politicians. A better democratic 
political culture will likely lead to a more mor-
ally virtuous citizenry by promoting the virtues 
of reasonableness, tolerance, open-mindedness, 
and respectfulness in citizens. In this way  good 
moral and political cultures can help to mutually 
support and reinforce one another. 
 In contrast,  bad moral and political cultures 
can tend to mutually corrupt one another. A 
bad political culture in which public corruption 
is rife and public debate is shrill and unreason-
able will tend to corrupt the moral character of 
its citizenry by incentivizing immoral actions, 
such as bribery, and encouraging bad character 
traits in citizens, such as intolerance. A bad 
moral culture in which citizens are unreason-
able, utterly selfish, and disrespectful of those 
who are different will tend to corrupt the 
political culture of a democracy by providing 
incentives for politicians to pander to the ille-
gitimate demands of the loudest, shrillest, and 
most powerful interest groups. 
 In conclusion, it is clear that there are a 
number of ways in which we can conceive of 
morality and politics, and of the relationship 
between them, and we have investigated a 
number of important versions of these views in 
this brief entry. 
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